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Abstract.  In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with 
externalities that seem to imply the need for macroeconomic policy coordination. However, if 
coordination is not complete, partial coordination might be unable to cope with the negative 
externalities arising from a decentralized policy management. This paper investigates different 
solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to 
the conservative central banker solution, which is found by recent literature able to impose wage 
moderation to the labor unions. We also discuss some aspects related to labor flexibility reforms 
as a solution for the unemployment problem. 
JEL codes: E62, E64, F15, F42 




This paper is about optimal institutions in a monetary union. We refer to three types of 
institutions: the common central bank, fiscal policy institutions, and trade unions. We consider 
some alternative ways of devising each of them and analyze the consequences of their 
interactions. In doing that we attempt to merge some developments in the monetary union 
literature stimulated by the creation of the European Monetary Union with others in the area of 
policy games between a central bank and one or more labor unions.  
By definition, a monetary union is a highly integrated economic area with a large number 
of interactions between the participating countries. Given the presence of externalities, the 
design of macroeconomic coordination is a crucial issue, but coordination is not a trivial 
outcome.  
For instance, one could argue that the introduction of a common monetary policy and 
restrictions on fiscal policy at the national level increase the need for macroeconomic policy 
cooperation due to the presence of externalities. However, given the potentially adverse reaction 
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of the central bank, fiscal coordination could be counterproductive or ineffective. In other 
words, the introduction of additional players like an additional country, the central bank or 
national labor unions could have dramatic effects on the standard propositions based on two-
country models, as e.g. Rogoff (1985a) or Kehoe (1988).
1  
The above effect is present in the recent literature. Fiscal authorities subject to a budget 
constraint are systematically neutralized by the central bank action.
2 This might also be the case 
for labor union coordination.  
In general, the need for international wage coordination emerges from the externalities 
associated with a nationally decentralized wage bargaining. External effects of wage setting at a 
national level have the same foundation as those stemming from bargaining at a lower (sub-
national) level.
3 In wage setting at a national level perception of the inflationary consequences 
for a wider than national area is limited and unions tend to be aggressive, as they can beggar-
their-neighbor. This is a powerful argument in favor of international wage cooperation. 
However, as noted above, international cooperation between unions – as distinct from their 
cooperation at a national level – introduces a new dimension, since unions interact with more 
common and national policymakers, which also may coordinate their policy or not. This 
complicates the picture and might lead to different outcomes. 
On the other hand, the consideration of trade unions can introduce a new perspective into 
macroeconomic policy coordination studies. In policy games between a central bank and one or 
more labor unions the equilibrium real output (gap) is in fact endogenously determined and 
public authorities may affect it even in a deterministic context.
4 Moreover, the endogenous 
determination of the real output gap seems to be more relevant for the European context since 
the European unemployment seems to be related more to structural factors than to cyclical ones 
(see, e.g., Calmfors, 2001).    
The investigation of the role played by a conservative central banker in a monetary union 
is also of specific interest. The traditional result about the conservative central banker, due to 
Rogoff (1985b), implies that a conservative central banker eliminates the problem of 
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and Lippi (1999) and (2002), and Coricelli et al. (2000) and (2001). 
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coordination between wage and monetary setters. Moreover, the recent literature has much 
debated the effects of a conservative central banker in a closed economy when many 
monopolistic wage setters operate adding new results to the traditional view.
5 In particular, if 
many labor unions operate in a monopolistic competition context and they do not take account 
of inflation, a conservative central banker can always reduce unemployment, in addition to 
inflation. A conservative banker in fact affects real variables as potential monetary restrictions 
reduce the free-riding behavior associated with the decentralized wage setting.
6 In a monetary 
union a similar role can be performed by the central banker interacting with national trade 
unions acting cooperatively.   
By linking together different strands of the policy game literature we aim to study some of 
the indicated problems of coordination in a simple two-country monetary union where a 
common central bank, national fiscal authorities, and labor unions interact. In particular, we 
investigate the possibility for a conservative central banker to be a perfect substitute for wage 
coordination. 
 
2. The model 
2.1 The economic framework 
Our baseline framework is an IS-AS model adapted to a two-country monetary union where 
wages are set by national monopoly workers’ associations. Therefore, the equilibrium real 
output gap is endogenously determined and can be different from zero even without considering 
shock effects.
7 Each country is specialized in the production of one good (or one basket of 
goods) and goods are imperfect substitutes. There is perfect competition between firms within 
each country, but imperfect competition between firms operating in different countries. 
Moreover, the monetary union is assumed to be a closed economy with respect to the rest of the 
world. In such a context, fiscal policies are determined by national governments and monetary 
policy by a common central bank. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate, which is 
common for the whole integrated area since perfect mobility of financial capital is assumed.
8 
More in detail, the economic framework where playmakers act is described by two relationships. 
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6 Notice that Coricelli et al. (2000), and subsequent studies, introduce non-neutrality of the monetary policy in a 
different way from the traditional, which is based on the union inflation aversion (see Gylfason and Lindbeck, 
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An aggregate demand (IS curve) represents the demand side of the economy, whereas the supply 
side is given by an aggregate firm profit maximization condition. 
Domestic demand is decreasing in the domestic expected real interest rate (as an effect of the 
saving-investment behavior of the private sector) and the product prices differential 
(competitiveness effects on foreign trade). It increases in home public expenditure, in a 
Keynesian flavor,
9 and foreign public expenditure (exports). The latter is a shortcut to consider 
positive fiscal externalities from foreign country taking place through exports.  Aggregate 
demand in the domestic country can then be expressed as:
10 
(1)  () ()
e
DD D F F D x ig g p p σπα β τ =− − + + + −  
In this equation (1) sub-indexes  D  and  F   denote the domestic and the foreign country; 
x yy =− is the real output (employment) gap defined as the difference between the actual level 
of output  y  and the potential one,  y , i.e. the competitive-market real output;  p  is the producer 
price for the produced composite commodity;  g  is public expenditure; i is the nominal interest 
rate, and 
e
D π  is the domestic expected inflation rate. Thus 
e
D i π −  is the real expected interest 
rate. Inflation is based on the consumer price index (or CPI), which is a weighted average of 
domestic and foreign prices:  
(2)  () 1 DD F vh p h p =− +   
As customary, we consider h smaller than  1
2 . Moreover, perfect foresight and an initial price 
parametrically set equal to zero are also assumed. Hence 
e vv =  and 
e v π =  hold. Since we are 
using a deterministic model, the assumption of perfect foresight is equivalent to that of rational 
expectations. 
The supply side of the economy is described by a standard firm aggregate profit-
maximizing condition:  
(3)  () DD D x pw ρ =−  
which, together with the given nominal wage,  D w , set by the monopoly union, fully describes 
the aggregate supply in the domestic economy.  
                                                           
9 It is assumed that the Ricardian equivalence does not hold, since our fiscal instrument can be seen as a balanced 
budget (see Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2003a: Appendix A) or a cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit (see Beetsma et 
al., 2002; or Uhlig, 2002).  
10 For the sake of the exposition, in describing equations we always refer to the “domestic” country. Of course, 
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By solving the structural form of the model and assuming, without loss of generality,
11  1 ρ = , 
we obtain the following expression for its reduced form for the domestic country (a similar 
expression holds for the other country, the foreign country): 
(4)  () 01 2 1 2
01 2 1 2
1 DD FD F
DD F D F
x ig g w w
vi ggww
ξζ ζ ξ ξ
ξϑ ϑ θ θ
 =+ + − − + 

=+ + + +  
  
where ξ0  = −σ /(1−σ) and   ()











. We assume  () 0,1 σ ∈  
and   () 21 2 0 h κτ σ =− − > . Appropriately combined, the above parameters  0 ξ ,  1 ξ , and  2 ξ , 
determine the values of all the others as follows:  () () 11 1 22 1 2 11 hh h h ξ θ ξξ θ ξξ >=− + >= +− ; 
112 221 ζ αξβ ξζ αξβ ξ =+> =+; and  () () 11 2 2 12 11 hh h h ϑ ζζ ϑ ζζ =− + > = +− . The reader 
should note that the government expenditure of each country has positive (negative) externalities 
on the employment (price) level of the other country. The assumption κ > 0 implies that 
increases in the nominal wage in one country raise real wages (in terms of both CPI and 
producer prices) and unemployment; reductions in nominal interest rate raise prices and 
employment, i.e. a standard trade-off regime holds. Although this case is the standard textbook 
situation, other regimes can arise 
12. The consequences of alternative regimes are not trivial (see 
Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2001: Appendix B). However, in this paper we limit our analysis 
to the standard trade-off regime for the sake of brevity.
13  
 
2.2 Game-timing and policymakers’ preferences 
We consider a game associated to the following timing. First, unions set wages (in an 
uncoordinated or coordinated manner), given the domestic labor demands. Then each 
government sets the public expenditure subject to a budget constraint, and in the end the central 
bank sets the nominal interest rate. The game timing captures the idea that unions form 
expectations on the fiscal and monetary policy, and that fiscal policy is “less flexible” than the 
monetary policy (i.e., in setting their instruments fiscal policymakers form rational expectations 
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coordination in a monetary union. 
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on the monetary authority’s actions). Prices are flexible and can continuously adjust at no cost.
14 
The game is solved backwards until the sub game perfect equilibrium is found. 











=− −  
  ∑∑      
where b is the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and  { } , N DF =  is the set of the 
countries. 







Gv x =− −      j N ∈        
Moreover, governments must respect a constraint on their instruments:  jj g g ≤  for j N ∈ . This 
limitation is imposed in order to capture the Stability and Growth Pact, which characterizes the 
European Monetary Union. Another way used by the literature to model the Stability and 
Growth Pact is to directly insert an instrument cost into the governments’ losses.
15 In our 
context, the additional-constraint approach seems to be a better way to model the Stability and 
Growth Pact. However, we have checked that our results do not depend on the way according to 
which the budget constraint is modeled, as they are also robust to the instrument-cost approach. 




j jj j j Uq w v x =− −     j N ∈   
In the above equation  j q  can be interpreted as the degree of distortion in the labor market, which 
depends on the strength of the national unions and the national unemployment benefit structure 
and employment protection legislation.
16  
2.3 The decentralized equilibrium 
In this sub-section, we consider the solution when the two unions simultaneously set the national 
nominal wage in a non-cooperative manner. The game is solved by backward induction 
according to the timing explained in the previous sub-section.  
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(2000: Chapter 16). 
15 See, among the others, Aarle et al. (2002) and (2003), Beetsma et al. (2002), and Uhlig (2002). 
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The optimization problem of the central bank consists in minimizing equation (5) with respect to 
the nominal interest rate, taking account of the constraint (4). The reaction function of the 
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Once the monetary policy rule is obtained, by maximizing equation (6) under the constraint (4) 
and (8), we find the domestic government reaction function (a similar expression holds for the 
foreign government): 
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where  () 14 1 DD th h υ =+ − − . Equation (9) implies that each government reacts to the other by 
raising the public expenditure. Moreover, the ceilings imposed to fiscal expenditures are always 
binding, since the reaction functions of the two governments are parallel. Thus,  D D g g =  and 
F F g g =  always hold.
17 
Each union maximizes its preference function subject to the optimal monetary (equation 





() () ( )
()
2
21 1 1 2 2 1
12 12 12
D FD F D
bb h bb
ww g g q
bb b
κκ κ κα β
κκ κκ κκ
++ + + +   −− +   =+ − +
++ ++ ++  
    
Notice that, if b > κ, the domestic union reaction to increases in foreign nominal wages implies a 
restrictive wage policy because of the potential adverse reaction of the monetary policy, the 
more so the higher b is. 
By solving the two-equation system formed by equation (10) and its foreign country 
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Similar expressions hold for the foreign country.  
Average real output and inflation in the monetary union are:  
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Equation (11) and (13) imply that monetary policy affects domestic and average real output. The 
result is not surprising since the existence of a wedge between the real wage relevant for firms 
(based on producer prices) and the real wage relevant for the unions (based on the consumer 
price index).
18   
It is easy to check that the real output gap is increasing in the elasticity of the terms of 
trade (τ) and decreasing in the foreign price weight in the consumer price index (h). This result 
is worth commenting in the light of the hump-shaped hypothesis suggested by Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988). In their analysis there are two opposing forces (competition and consideration of 
effects of wage changes on the CPI) which determine the outcome of decentralized wage 
bargaining. The same two forces operate in a more explicit way in our model at an international 
level.  
By derivation of equation (13) and (14) with respect to b, we can also assert that increases 
in the central bank degree of conservativeness reduce the inflation rate and raise the real output 
level (or reduce the real output gap). Hence, the same result as in Coricelli et al. (2000) holds in 
our model. 
Since the conservative central banker increases the social welfare (in terms of any welfare 
function decreasing in inflation and unemployment), it is interesting to compute the ultra 
conservative central bank solution, i.e. the solution associated with b →+ ∞. This turns out to 
be: 


















= ∑  
Note that the output gap associated to equation (15) is the lowest possible in a monetary union 
with decentralized labor markets since the real output gap monotonically decreases with the 
degree of conservativeness.  
Budget constraints rule fiscal authorities out of the demand policy setting. In fact, these 
can affect neither domestic real output nor average output and inflation in the monetary union.  
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The central bank supremacy implied by the budget constraints confirms some intuitions 
highlighted, in a different context, by Calmfors (2001) about the effects of a monetary union on 
the need for flexibility.
19 Increases in the degree of conservativeness of  the central bank can in 
fact reduce the incentive for labor market reforms, i.e. reduction in labor market distortion (qi), 
since in solving the inflation bias problem a more conservative central bank also reduces 
unemployment.
20   
Fiscal policy does not affect the domestic price either, if the budget constraints of the two 
countries are equal. It can only affect the distribution of inflation between the countries. 
Therefore, the Stability and Growth Pact can be used to equalize the different inflation rate 
among the countries associated with different labor market distortions.   
Assuming that a uniform inflation rate in the monetary union is a desired target for the 
common institutions, it could be reached irrespectively of the different labor market distortions 
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Of course, equation (17) implies an equal ceiling to government expenditure in the two countries 
if the union is symmetric, i.e. both the domestic and the foreign country are associated with an 
equal degree of distortion in the labor market.
22 In the asymmetric case, countries with higher 
distortions should be associated with a more stringent constraint, and vice versa.  
2.4 The centralized equilibrium 
In this sub-section, we consider the solutions of a game when the two unions seek to maximize 
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By solving in a similar manner to that of the previous sub-section, we obtain the following 
equilibrium outcomes for the domestic country and the monetary union area:  
                                                           
19 Calmfors (2001) compares the position of countries inside a monetary union to those outside it with respect to the 
desirability of labor market reforms.  
20 Of course, the underlying assumption is that the central bank is more conservative than the government. 
21 Recall that in our symmetric framework the common central bank cannot affect national prices and output gaps in 
a differentiated manner. 
22 In this paper we focus on asymmetries in the labor markets only. Without them an equal budget constraint would 
be required. The policy of differentiating the budget constraints can be applied also in the case of asymmetries 
implied by different factors. However, the case of asymmetries in the union preferences is the most interesting one, 
since union action in the model is endogenous, and therefore, it might neutralize any attempt to equalize national 
inflation rates.   10
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Now unions internalize the negative externality associated with the decentralized bargaining and 
the central bank cannot affect the real output either domestically or in the average of the 
monetary union.
23 The degree of conservatism of the central bank is then irrelevant. Fiscal 
policy again cannot affect aggregate variables and can be used only to equalize inflation rates in 
the area by introducing an appropriate relative budget constraint. An ultra conservative central 
bank reduces the inflation to zero, i.e. the standard conservative central banker’s result applies.  
The centralized labor market solution is always associated with a lower real output gap 
than the decentralized one, as we can derive by comparing equation (21) with equation (15). 
Recall that equation (15) is the lowest real output gap associated with the decentralized solution. 
In addition, by comparing equation (22) with equation (14), it is found that the centralized labor 
market solution is also associated with a lower inflation average. 
In both equation  (11) and (19) real output can be increased by reducing the labor market 
distortion parameters. For instance, a reform reducing unemployment benefits reduces qi, as it 
increases the costs of unemployment and, therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between 
output (employment) and the real wage. This result would highlight the need for flexibility in 
European countries as unemployment solution suggested by, among the others, OECD (1994), 
Bean (1998) and subsequent literature.  However, in a way similar to that used by Soskice 
(1990) in analyzing the hump-shaped hypothesis in a closed economy, we show that this is not 
the only way since a different policy can lead to similar results by increasing the wage setter 
coordination at the European level. 
 
3. Summary and conclusions 
If, in order to solve the problem of coordination between the central bank and national 
governments, national budget ceilings are imposed, monetary policy dominates over fiscal  11
policy, which has limited effects on the economy. The cost of this crowding-out is given by the 
relative rigidity of the monetary policy, which cannot differentially react to asymmetries present, 
e.g., in the labor markets. A limited solution to this problem is to manage the relative budget 
constraint, i.e. the budget constraint of one country relatively to the other. Fiscal policy can only 
be used to redistribute the effects of inflation, as it is unable to affect real output at both the 
national and the monetary union level.   
A conservative central bank solves the problem of coordination between the monetary 
authority and wage setters.  It eliminates the central bank’s temptation to inflate the economy in 
the attempt to reduce the real output gap and, therefore, eliminates the inflation bias. Moreover, 
if wages are set in a decentralized manner, the central bank also has an influence on the real 
output gap. This is due to the lack of coordination between the national labor unions, which are 
unable to internalize the negative externalities associated with decentralized wage bargaining. A 
more conservative central bank induces wage moderation since the unions understand that their 
attempt to export inflation when they raise nominal wages will be impaired by the central bank.  
A conservative central bank is however only a second best solution in internalizing the 
externalities arising from decentralized wage bargaining, as wage coordination is Pareto superior 
to the decentralized solution for any possible value of the degree of conservativeness. In other 
words, the imposition of a conservative central banker only partially solves the problem of 
coordination between the two national labor unions. However, as said before, it eliminates the 
problem of coordination between labor unions and the central bank. 
Summarizing, the imposition of budget ceilings to fiscal policy public expenditure can 
solve the coordination problem between the governments and the central bank and between 
fiscal authorities. However, this solution is not without costs. As to the conservativeness of the 
central bank the central banker solution remains a first best solution for solving the negative 
externality associated with the decentralization of supply (nominal wage) and demand (nominal 
supply of money) policies. In the case of decentralization of wage bargaining, it also has the 
favorable property that it increases the real output by imposing wage moderation. However, the 
roots of monetary policy effects on real output are different from the traditional ones
24 and 
monetary policy results to be only a second best policy for internalizing the decentralized wage-
setting externalities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
23 Note that average outcomes are independent of the economy parameters. This is due to the symmetry of the 
structure of the two countries and to the fact that unions internalize the externalities. 
24 See Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994).  12
The results of our paper seem to confirm that recent policy of European labor unions 
attempting to increase wage coordination goes in the right direction and should be given an 
incentive by the European Institutions. 
 
Appendix A – The reduced form model 
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Equation (A.1) describes a symmetric monetary union. In fact, this paper focuses on 
asymmetries associated with the players’ preferences only. More details on the structural and 
reduced form of the model, its derivation, and the possible regimes, which can emerge, can be 
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